১. বখতিয়ার খলজি (১২০৪-১২০৬)
২. মুহাম্মদ শিরান খলজি (১২০৬-১২০৮)
৩. ইওয়াজ খলজি (১২০৮-১২১০ এবং ১২১২-১২২৭)
৪. আলী মর্দান খলজি (১২১০-১২১২)
৫. নাসিরউদ্দিন মাহমুদ (১২২৭-১২২৯)
৬. আলাউদ্দিন দৌলত খলজি (১২২৯-১২৩০)
৭. বলকা খলজি (১২৩০-১২৩১)
৮. আলাউদ্দিন জানী (১২৩২-১২৩৩)
৯. সাইফুদ্দিন আইবেক (১২৩৩-১২৩৬)
১০. আউর খান আইবেক (১২৩৬)
১১. তুগ্রুল তুঘান খান (১২৩৬-১২৪৬ এবং ১২৭২-১২৮১)
১২. তুঘলক তমর খান (১২৪৬-১২৪৭)
১৩. জালালুদ্দিন মাসুদ জানী (১২৪৭-১২৫১)
১৪. মালিক ইখতিয়ারউদ্দিন উজবেক (১২৫১-১২৫৭)
১৫. ইজ্জউদ্দিন বলবন উজবেকি (১২৫৭-১২৫৯)
১৬. তাতার খান (১২৫৯-১২৬৮)
১৭. শের খান (১২৬৮-১২৭২)
১৮. আমিন খান (১২৭২)
১৯. নাসিরউদ্দিন বুগরা খান (১২৮১-১২৯১)
২০. রুকনুদ্দিন কায়কাউস (১২৯১-১৩০০)
২১. শামসুদ্দিন ফিরোজ শাহ (১৩০০-১৩২২)
২২. গিয়াসউদ্দিন বাহাদুর শাহ (১৩২২-১৩২৮)
২৩. বাহরাম খান (১৩২৮-১৩৩৮) [সোনারগাঁও]
কাদের খান (১৩২৮-১৩৩৬) [লখনৌত]
আজম খান (১৩২৪-১৩২৮) [সাতগাঁও]
২৪. ফখরুদ্দিন মুবারক শাহ (১৩৩৮-১৩৪৯) [সোনারগাঁও]
মুখলিস (১৩৩৬-১৩৩৯) [লখনৌত]
ইজ্জউদ্দিন ইয়াহিয়া (১৩২৮-১৩৩৮) [সাতগাঁও]
২৫. ইখতিয়ারউদ্দিন গাজী শাহ (১৩৪৯-১৩৫২) [সোনারগাঁও]
আলাউদ্দিন আলী শাহ (১৩৩৯-১৩৪২) [লখনৌত]
ইলিয়াস শাহ (১৩৩৯-১৩৪২) [সাতগাঁও] এবং
(১৩৪২-১৩৫২) [সাতগাঁও ও লখনৌতসহ]
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সোনারগাঁও, লখনৌত এবং সাতগাঁও সালতানাতের মানচিত্র!!
Read MoreAuthor: Saikat Bhattacharya
Historical General 14-July-2026 by east is risingThe majority of Soviet citizens voted to preserve the USSR in the ‘91 referendum, but this was ignored by Boris Yeltsin when he signed the Belozezha accords later that same year. He then imposed shock therapy privatization that wrecked the former Soviet economy & when the Supreme Soviet voted to impeach him in ‘93, Yeltsin ordered tanks to shell parliament & arrest the lawmakers. A few years later, he had a public approval rating of about 3%, so he rigged the ‘96 presidential election against Gennady Zyuganov from the KPRF, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, to stay in power in spite of his alcoholism & declining health.
The 3rd of July marked the 30th anniversary of Boris Yeltsin's re-election in one of the most consequential presidential contests of the twentieth century. Western governments, corporate media and international financial institutions celebrated the result as a triumph of "democracy" over the alleged threat of a communist return.
For the Russian working class, however, the election meant something entirely different. It marked the decisive consolidation of the capitalist counter-revolution that had begun with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
By 1996, the chief architect of Russia's capitalist restoration, Boris Yeltsin, was anything but a popular leader. Five years of "shock therapy," mass privatisations and capitalist restructuring had devastated the productive foundations inherited from socialism. Millions saw their savings wiped out, wages went unpaid for months, unemployment and poverty exploded, while a handful of oligarchs accumulated enormous fortunes by appropriating public wealth built through decades of socialist construction. The war in Chechnya further eroded the government's legitimacy, and Yeltsin's approval ratings had collapsed. Under normal political conditions, his defeat appeared entirely possible.
That prospect alarmed not only Russia's newly emerging capitalist class but also Washington and its Western allies. For U.S. imperialism, the issue was never Yeltsin as an individual. He had become the indispensable political instrument for making capitalist restoration irreversible.
The Clinton administration openly backed his government, while the International Monetary Fund approved a multi-billion-dollar loan only months before the election, providing crucial financial breathing space for an increasingly unpopular administration. At the same time, Russia's oligarch-controlled television networks abandoned any pretence of neutrality, transforming the campaign into an unprecedented anti-communist offensive designed to prevent the victory of Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov.
Contemporary reports and later investigations also documented extensive violations of campaign regulations, the abuse of state resources and overwhelming media bias in favour of the incumbent. The famous Time magazine cover proclaiming "Yanks to the Rescue" symbolised a remarkable admission: when the interests of capitalism were at stake, U.S. political intervention was not denied but proudly celebrated.
The lesson of 1996 reaches far beyond Russia. The election demonstrated, once again, that imperialism has never regarded bourgeois democracy as an absolute principle. Elections are celebrated only when they secure outcomes acceptable to monopoly capital. When the possibility—even a limited one—emerges that the political course might challenge the interests of capitalism, the full weight of financial institutions, corporate media, diplomatic pressure and ideological warfare is mobilised to shape the result. The objective was not to "save democracy." It was to save capitalist restoration.
Three decades later, the consequences remain unmistakable. The election of 1996 accelerated the destruction of the remaining economic and social achievements inherited from Soviet socialism and consolidated the rule of oligarchic capitalism over Russia. Those who today denounce alleged foreign interference in elections rarely recall the enthusiasm with which Western governments applauded their own intervention in Russia's political future. There is no contradiction. For imperialism, "democracy" has always been subordinate to class interests.
The thirtieth anniversary of the 1996 election is therefore not merely a historical commemoration. It is a reminder of a fundamental truth repeatedly confirmed throughout modern history: whenever the interests of monopoly capital are threatened, imperialism abandons every moral sermon about democracy and openly intervenes to defend the existing social order. Washington did not save Russian democracy in 1996. It helped secure the victory of capitalist counter-revolution. And in doing so, it offered yet another demonstration that anti-communism remains, above all else, the ideological weapon of a system determined to preserve exploitation against the possibility of socialist change.
Author: Saikat Bhattacharya
Theoretical General Socialism Communism Xi Jinping Mao USSR China 14-July-2026 by east is risingFROM DELTAGRAM : https://thedeltagram.com/economy/trade-or-dumping-bangladesh-and-india-s-8bn-trade-imbalance-explained?fbclid=IwY2xjawTCmlFleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFVeUVGSkYxUGNPdU1hWDRmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHgh7jLwgxan_ttA3JuScE0GMGQkbTxzt27WYapca8-sa480ZQXfP95R3U0Ma_aem_IJr6W0JaJPNLgpvdA56tdA
Cotton, yarn and machinery flow in from India while Bangladeshi exports struggle against non-tariff barriers
MA Zaman
Bangladesh and India share one of South Asia's largest trading relationships, built on geography, connectivity and decades of economic cooperation. But behind the rising volume of commerce lies a widening imbalance that now worries policymakers and domestic industries alike.
In fiscal year 2024-25, Bangladesh imported $9.5 billion worth of goods and services from India while exporting only $1.7 billion, according to Bangladesh Bank data. Commerce and Industries Minister Khandaker Abdul Muktadir confirmed the gap on April 20 in the national parliament, putting the trade deficit with India at $7.86 billion for FY25.
"Bangladesh's trade deficit [among SAARC members] with India is the highest," the minister said.
Bangladesh also runs deficits with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Pakistan, he noted, while enjoying surpluses with Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives among SAARC countries.
Showkat Aziz Russell, president of the Bangladesh Textile Mills Association, told reporters at a press briefing last year that he saw a plot to destroy Bangladesh's textile and garment sector the way jute manufacturing was destroyed before it, accusing the Indian government of enabling the practice through subsidies and support schemes
The numbers reflect Bangladesh's heavy reliance on Indian goods, from cotton, yarn, rice, sugar and spices to automobiles, machinery, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and industrial raw materials. This dependence keeps local manufacturing running, but businesses say the playing field is tilting.
Industry complaints mount
Manufacturers in several sectors have long complained that low-priced Indian imports make it hard to compete. Sugar, yarn, ceramics, processed foods, steel items and some farm commodities feature repeatedly in these complaints. Bangladesh's onion farmers have at various times demanded a ban on Indian onion imports to secure fairer prices.
Textile millers have gone furthest, accusing their Indian counterparts of dumping yarn and fabric as part of what they call a deliberate campaign against the local industry. Showkat Aziz Russell, president of the Bangladesh Textile Mills Association, told reporters at a press briefing last year that he saw a plot to destroy Bangladesh's textile and garment sector the way jute manufacturing was destroyed before it, accusing the Indian government of enabling the practice through subsidies and support schemes.
Does the evidence support "dumping"?
Trade experts are more cautious. Under WTO rules, dumping means exporters sell goods abroad below normal value in a way that causes material injury to a domestic industry, and proving it requires a formal investigation backed by evidence, not assertion. No such complaint has been filed with the WTO.
Fuad M Khalid Hossen, a trade facilitation and policy reform specialist and CEO of TRACE Consulting, said there is no official evidence of systematic dumping. Concerns in textiles, steel and agriculture are real, he said, but concerns alone do not meet the legal bar; Bangladesh would need to prove injury and build a formal case.
He argued that cheaper Indian goods more likely reflect stronger competitiveness, since Indian manufacturers benefit from economies of scale, larger production capacity and lower costs, none of which by itself amounts to unfair trade.
He added that quantifying subsidies under WTO rules is technically difficult and much of the underlying data is not readily available, which further complicates any anti-dumping case.
M Masrur Reaz, chairman of Policy Exchange Bangladesh, agreed that Bangladesh needs stronger trade intelligence and market monitoring, and should invoke WTO trade remedy measures where a genuine case exists.
He added that anti-dumping decisions often carry a political dimension, and that better trade-oriented trust between the two governments could reduce the need for them altogether.
Mostafa Abid Khan, a trade economist and former member of the Bangladesh Trade and Tariff Commission, said Bangladesh has failed to fully use its WTO rights and that slapping duties on Indian yarn is not a simple fix, since garment exporters depend on that yarn to stay competitive globally.
On the recurring onion-ban irritant, both economists offered the same read from different angles. Khan urged India to notify trade partners before imposing sudden export restrictions.
Bangladesh and Pakistan talk trade again. The hard part starts now
Bangladesh and Pakistan talk trade again. The hard part starts now
Jute has dominated trade for decades; both sides now want food, pharma and fertiliser too
Fuad went further, arguing the bans should not be read as dumping at all: every country has the right to prioritise its domestic market when supplies tighten, he said, and the real lesson for Bangladesh is to strengthen its own production, storage and supply chains rather than lean on imports.
Structural roots of the deficit
The imbalance stems from structure, not just policy. Bangladesh's export basket to India stays narrow, dominated by garments, jute products, leather goods and a limited range of farm items. India, by contrast, exports a much wider range of manufactured and industrial goods.
Machinery, chemicals and intermediate goods from India are essential inputs for factories that export onward to Europe and North America. Geographic proximity keeps Indian products cheaper to move than goods sourced from farther markets.
Fuad framed this as largely a market outcome rather than a policy failure. In a free-market economy, he said, businesses source products from wherever they are cheaper and logistics easier, which is also why China's proximity and range of price points have made it Bangladesh's dominant import source overall.
Bangladesh's weak export performance in India, he said, owes to both direct competition (the two countries produce many similar products) and non-tariff barriers, particularly stringent testing and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. A Mutual Recognition Agreement the two countries signed to recognise each other's product testing has not delivered the benefits policymakers hoped for, he added.
Trade tensions add friction
Relations have grown more complicated recently. India withdrew the transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports through its land borders and later restricted the entry of several Bangladeshi products at specific land ports, citing logistical and administrative reasons. Bangladesh has, at times, imposed its own restrictions on select Indian imports during the interim government's tenure.
What Bangladesh can do
Economists argue that closing the deficit does not mean importing less; it means exporting more.
Reaz said Bangladesh's exports to India remain relatively small and there is significant room to expand them, since more than 80 per cent of the country's exports still go to the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, leaving markets like India underused.
The real barrier, he said, is not tariffs but non-tariff hurdles, especially weak harmonisation of product standards between the two countries.
He also flagged India's northeastern states as an untapped market held back mainly by political mistrust rather than economics.
Khan cautioned against simply cutting imports from India, since more than a third arrive under back-to-back letters of credit that support export manufacturing. Reducing them without a plan, he said, would hurt Bangladeshi industry rather than help it; the better strategy is to grow exports to these markets, not shrink imports from them.
Fuad added a caveat on strategic goods: while most commercial imports should be left to market forces, energy, wheat and other sensitive commodities need a deliberate diversification strategy because they are tied directly to national supply security.
Read MoreAuthor: Saikat Bhattacharya
International geopolitics General world order 14-July-2026 by east is rising
